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Revisiting Architectural Requirements for Visual Processes
1 Introduction: Ideas of mental architectures 
1.1 Vision viewed from a different angle
This paper focuses on areas to be explained, and not 
on providing a model (a solution) for use in the study 
of vision. Contemporary experts reject Kant’s propos-
al in 1781 that knowledge of mathematics should nei-
ther be viewed empirically nor synthetically. However, 
Sloman (1962) tried to defend Kant’s views in the light 
of multi-disciplinary knowledge of fields including 
education, neuroscience, linguistics, psychology, etc. 
Attempts are made to show how visual ability in 
some animals, humans and androids is governed by 
the ability to reason about their environment, includ-
ing not only the presence but the absence of processes. 
Therefore, we need to pay attention to what is not 
happening, a step ignored by most researchers. Visual 
researchers such as Kaneff (1970) often dealt with im-
age structure, Marr (1982) thought of vision as provid-
ing physical facts, Berthoz (2000) and others think of 
vision as a behaviour control tool and Gibson and Pick 
(2000) view vision as environmental potential ability 
input. 
1.2 Complete systems are important
Vision is dependent on interactions between the 
sensory systems, action-control systems and central 
control areas. Each part has been changed by evolu-
tion to become what they are today, and continue to 
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change as we develop as an individual. Therefore, the 
visual architecture can differ due to differences in 
species, and also due to differing individual develop-
ment within a species. One example of individual dif-
ference is that produced by culture – the interpretation 
of gestures. Another may be a variation of the reading 
of written symbols.
Understanding of the complete system is important. 
After all, one may sense a facial expression such as 
happiness but, if the underlying, central mechanisms 
are not equipped to make use of the incoming infor-
mation, the sensory system will have little meaning. 
Instead of asking what happens under certain con-
ditions, psychologists would be better off asking “how” 
things happen under a holistic design-based approach. 
We could then use that knowledge gained to produce 
lists of requirements. These lists would be used to 
investigate which functions are best incorporated into 
artificial neural systems, whether for further experi-
mentation and analysis or for commercial projects/
products.  
We also need to understand what happens in the ab-
sence of certain aspects of a design. We already have 
input for this from studies of cases of brain damage 
and sensory reduction, among others. Understand-
ing of this may help us to treat future problems of a 
similar sort, underlining the importance of building 
and studying incomplete systems, yet focusing on the 
whole.
Sloman (2000) tells us that we need to understand 
niche space (the space of possible sets of requirements) 
and design space (the space of possible designs). Fur-
thermore, we need to understand the interactions and 
relationships between the two spaces within one eco-
system, and how changes in one space (niche or design) 
may affect other niche or design spaces. 
Analysis of sets of functions should give us a list of 
possibilities for a system (visual or mental). A logical 
topography of states could be subdivided, in a com-
monsensical way, into logical geographies, as laid out 
in Ryle, 1949. This lets us see that classification from a 
common-sense point of view has a place within a scien-
tific explanation. 
1.3 General languages of representation
Current researchers often are committed to particu-
lar modelling forms, as they already have the tools for 
creating such designs. However, a more generalised 
semantic has been recognised in biological systems. 
Researchers’ commitments can limit them in the sce-
narios they can set up and results they can produce.
Very young children and many animals can react to 
processes using an internal and general language (i.e., 
not a learned language from their society). This helps 
them to reason about changes they see happening and, 
possibly, about what they notice not to be happening. 
Various scales of abstraction can be represented with-
out having to use external, learned structures.
2 Interactive systems (wholes) and scaled up 
systems (parts)
2.1 Joining parts to create a “scaled out” system
A complete system, whether it is an animal or a ro-
bot, needs components which can interact with other, 
different components. This is called scaling out and 
is in contrast to the often focused on scaled up system 
which is one that can handle larger and deeper inputs. 
Human systems are often scaled out components, 
and it is such interaction that distinguishes us from 
machines. Most systems artificially created by re-
searchers work well on their own in experiments, but 
do not work well with each other. They can scale up, 
but cannot efficiently scale out. This tells us that some 
systems, while they work as well or even better than 
their biological counterparts, are not useful as part 
of a whole system. For example, a computer system 
designed to teach a foreign language may not be effec-
tive when asked to learn a new language itself, while 
its biological peer may activate another component to 
complete the task.
2.2 Mechanisms versus whole designs
Brooks (1991) recommends us to build whole sys-
tems instead of the mechanisms being currently built. 
Neural networks are one mechanism often used in AI 
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but we need to move beyond the parts and find out 
what the whole can do in order to study what require-
ments can be satisfied by new designs. For example, 
we may be able to find out what parts of the brain are 
activated while completing or understanding a task 
using brain imaging, but maybe who should instead 
focus on what the whole brain is exactly doing and 
what it is not doing, along with what messages are be-
ing passed and not passed.
We may be focused on creating null hypotheses 
while we should instead, as put forward by Lakatos 
(1980), separate research into purely empirical science 
based on laws, and the science of possibilities.
2.3 Vision and differences from mathematical 
reasoning.
Returning to Kant, he tells us that new truths can be 
discovered that expand our knowledge, which are not 
analytical and not empirical. We can visualise what 
happens when a change is made, even if we do not ac-
tually make such a change. In a mathematical formula, 
for instance, we can see that a different result is pro-
duced without actually making the change. Such rea-
soning can be visual (in the case of mentally drawing 
a line perpendicular to another line in order to find its 
midpoint) or can be a result of perception of temporal 
and spatial relationships (such as mapping or relating 
a series of objects). However, both types use related 
competences which are expected to work together, i.e., 
to scale out.
2.4 Growth of competences.
Young children cannot see all relationships, nor 
think about their existence. For example, a young 
child playing with a shape puzzle may be able to pick 
the pieces up and be able to place them in approxi-
mately the correct area, but may not be able to make 
them fit. The boundaries of the pieces and the holes 
may not match exactly, but the young child will try to 
press the piece in anyway. The young child needs to 
develop their awareness of objects and their boundar-
ies using at least the following three aspects: (1) repre-
sentation of objects; (2) acceptance of new ideas; and 
(3) manipulation of representations. Suavy and Suavy 
(1974) tell us that these skills are then built upon to 
understand what structures  and processes can help us 
and which can hinder us in our tasks.
3 Realisation of processes and possibilities
3.1 Understanding changes and lack of changes
The ability to reason visually needs (1) the ability to 
see parts and their relationship in a complex system, 
(2) the skill to be able to decide what changes can be 
made, including constraints and possibilities, and (3) 
the awareness to be able to see what the consequences 
of such changes would be.
The ability to see both constraints and possibilities 
concurrently are important in building visual models 
as the ability to perceive what might happen if a con-
straint were to be removed is important in truly under-
standing the surrounding environment. For example, 
seeing that a car would crash if a competent driver (a 
constraint to a crash) were not present is important in 
creating a robotic system that might otherwise decide 
that the driver is redundant and remove him from, or 
fail to (re)place him in a system.
Warneken and Tomasello in 2006 showed with vid-
eo footage how some primates and also human infants 
can react to such constraints on behalf of others using 
their generalised language abilities.
3.2 Evolution of independent sensorimotor signals
Visual skills help us when grasping objects using 
independent tools, such as hands or teeth. When the 
3-D world in taken into consideration, the number of 
possible patterns is huge, yet we are able to process 
such options quickly due to our holistic biological 
design. Creating a design for artificial 3-D grasp-
ing needs not only sensorimotor signals, or not even 
such signals, but instead a language and design using 
spatial processes and structures capable of producing 
results in 3-D. The design will need to have reusable, 
generic mappings between processes, structures and 
motor signal patterns. 
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4 General conceptions of vision
4.1 Generative representations and limitations
Animals are adept at recognising what can impede 
their progress, or the progress of others. This allows 
the process of creation to begin, as evidenced by Weir, 
Chapell and Kacelnik in 2002 on their observations of 
a crow which used a tool (a bent hook) to get around a 
problem of not being able to reach some food.
AI vision researchers can omit to focus on what ani-
mals perceive in their world, the realisation that some-
thing does not exist but that it could exist. They focus on 
the acquirement of information from the environment 
and therefore miss the chance to have their machine 
create or manipulate the environment the way biologi-
cal systems can do. They end up creating an artificial 
system that does not representation a biological system. 
In fairness to them, however, very young infants do 
not display this ability to manipulate their environment 
(Gibson and Pick, 2000) so it can be claimed that AI 
does represent the innate state of humans in that case.
4.2 Combining processes in complex systems
It must be remembered that processes occur in the 
environment of time and space, and that their parts 
are affected in different ways by such an environment. 
They can be combined in the following ways (Sloman 
2009):
◦ a sequence of processes forming a complex
process;
◦ parallel processes;
◦ chronological overlap, with the second and third
starting before the first (think of a soccer match
where the striker has already moved into position
anticipating another player receiving the ball and
passing it to him, with the striker being marked by
another player);
◦ spatial overlap (think of 3-D work, such as
carpentry);
◦ mutual modification (one process can slow another,
which speeds up a related process, in a feedback,
or reverse feedback loop);
◦ one process kick-starts another, for example a
computer bootstrapping.
In order to understand the above, humans (and, as 
a consequence, human intelligence mapping AI) need 
methods of perceiving such interactions. 
4.3 Processes occurring in space: reasoning
We can learn empirically about interactions in spa-
tial and temporal planes but humans and a number of 
animals may need to be able to predict consequences 
of combinations that do not exist but may exist. Such 
combinations may include walking on an uneven sur-
face while carrying a fragile object. It is better to be 
able to predict what may happen and to take action to 
prevent negative circumstances than to adopt a wait-
and-see approach. We need to learn how one process 
can cause a new process to begin or, at least, how one 
process can provide information about a potential dif-
ferent but related process. 
Actions can have consequences, often caused by 
new situations being created by such actions. A pot 
may become hot by another process heating it, some-
thing that can be detected by visually analysing the 
environment with background knowledge. Figure 1, 
shows how a new situation is created as a consequence 
of shifting position relative to an open door.
Figure 1. The closer you get to the door, the more 
access you will have about the contents of the room. 
In contrast, the farther away you move, the less 
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information you will have. A move to the left or right 
will change the visual input you receive.
4.4 Reasoning about processes and impedances that 
produce creativity
Objects work together in holistic systems, some-
times causing problems instead of solutions. It is up 
to the central controller or the receiver of the input to 
figure out solutions to such problems.
When processes occur, limitations of each can com-
bine to create large limitations of the whole. In the 
3-D world, spatial issues exist as in Figure 2. A chair 
may be lifted from place to place and a door may offer 
access to different areas of the house. However, when 
they come together we may end up failing to be able 
to access the functions of each process due to certain 
spatial limitations of the door and the chair. We may 
find that the chair cannot fit through the door and this 
failure may cause the subject (a human) to discover 
that rotating the moveable object a certain number of 
degrees about its axes can result in the desired goal 
(that of being able to move the chair through the door) 
begin achieved. This can all be done visually too, yet 
we are not able to explain what brain patterns are ac-
tive in performing such a task. Traditional AI models 
cannot replicate the sophistication required to do this 
using their current systems.
Figure 2. A person has the ability to figure out how 
to move a chair through a door by working out trans-
lations and spatial rotations in 3-D about the chair’s 
axes, some processes done in sequence and others in 
parallel. Current AI designs are limited in their ability 
to handle such a holistic task.
5 Conclusions
Sloman (1989) proposes that we replace architec-
tures of the “modular” sort with those of the “labyrin-
thine” type in order to realistically represent the vari-
ous components in a visual system and the intercon-
nectivity between subsystems of a visual nature and 
other subsystems such as auditory, action control, etc. 
This research review confirms that proposal.
Human vision needs to be related to previous evo-
lutionary models, including the visual systems pos-
sessed by other animals. Newer (more highly evolved) 
systems should not replace older (more primitive) 
ones, but be built upon them to create a layered infra-
structure with concurrent levels of abstraction. Each 
layer may use different semantics and mechanisms, 
yet all be interconnected in some way and all be regis-
tered partly with the optic array.
The environment needs to be taken into account as 
focusing solely on the internal side of the organism 
will not lead to a full understanding of the system, in 
essence, the environment forms part of the organism 
at that time. The environment has unique meaning for 
each organism, even if all organisms are situated in 
the same place. Each creates its own niche. Neisser 
(1976) points out that the study of minds and brains 
is meaningless without the study of the environments 
they were evolved to function in.
The modelling of human vision needs mathematical 
reasoning about geometric structures. Humans need to 
reason about what they perceive in order to plan, pre-
dict and explain what is going on which, in turn leads 
to the control of processes which are highly interde-
pendent. It follows that spatial reasoning is needed if 
truly useful and accurate models of human vision are 
to be designed.
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